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a b s t r a c t
A spirited debate explores the comparative merits of two different approaches to the enforcement of
regulatory law: the coercive approach, which emphasizes the deterrence of noncompliance through
inﬂexibly imposed sanctions, and the cooperative approach, which emphasizes the inducement of compliance through ﬂexibility and assistance. Both scholarly and policymaking communities are interested
in this topic of enforcement approach within the realms of ﬁnance, tax compliance, occupational safety,
food and drug safety, consumer product safety, and environmental protection. To inform this debate,
our study explores enforcement of environmental protection laws where the debate has been especially
spirited yet lacking in much empirical evidence. Speciﬁcally our study empirically analyzes the effects of
these two approaches on environmental management practices linked to compliance with wastewater
discharge limits imposed on chemical manufacturing facilities. For this analysis, we view the enforcement
approach as representing a relationship between a regulator and a regulated entity that is measured in
multiple dimensions so that we are able to explore the extent of cooperation or coercion. The empirical
results reveal that a more cooperative relationship induces better environmental management.
© 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction
For years a spirited debate has explored the comparative merits of two different approaches to the enforcement of regulatory
law: the coercive approach, which emphasizes the deterrence of
non-compliance through sanctions, and the cooperative approach,
which emphasizes the inducement of compliance through ﬂexible
means such as compliance assistance designed to induce facilities to address noncompliance pro-actively. Both scholarly and
policymaking communities are interested in these enforcement
approaches as applied to ﬁnance, tax compliance, occupational
safety, food and drug safety, consumer product safety, and environmental protection (Ayers and Braithwaite, 1992). Debate over
environmental enforcement is especially signiﬁcant in that compliance assurance a contentious issue in the post-2000 EPA policy
agenda (EPA, 2000; Glicksman and Earnhart, 2007).
Under the coercive model, the deterrence of violations is the fundamental purpose of environmental enforcement (Markel, 2000,
2005; Mintz, 1995). The imposition of enforcement sanctions is the
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most effective way to induce compliance with regulatory obligations. Under the cooperative model, enforcement focuses more on
compliance than deterrence based on the premise that regulated
facilities face incentives to comply other than enforcement threats
(Stoughton et al., 2001; Andreen, 2007). In this light, a coercive
approach may even be counterproductive by engendering intransigence and ill will from facilities.
Over the years, environmental enforcement in the United States
has shifted from traditional, deterrence-based enforcement toward
a more partnership-based, less adversarial approach that uses multiple tools to induce compliance (Stoughton et al., 2001). During
the 1990s, EPA adopted enforcement policies designed to provide
a more ﬂexible approach to inducing regulatory compliance by
offering “compliance incentives” and “compliance assistance” to
regulated facilities (Andreen, 2007). Similarly, many states have
replaced aspects of traditional enforcement with some form of
cooperation (Andreen, 2007). However, no shift from a coercive to
a cooperative approach has been complete. Despite the dichotomy
between these approaches, agencies rarely rely exclusively on
one approach; studies of agency enforcement reveal that “most
enforcers use a ﬂexible, hybrid strategy that includes elements of
both coercion and cooperation” (Rechtschaffen, 2004).
Despite the debate over enforcement approaches, relatively
little empirical research has compared the two approaches.
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Speciﬁcally, few studies empirically test these competing theories
about how best to induce environmental compliance or spur regulated facilities to undertake better environmental management
that in turn should lead to environmental compliance.
This study addresses the paucity of empirical evidence by
examining the effects of the two enforcement approaches on
environmental management practices of chemical manufacturing
facilities regulated under the Clean Water Act (CWA). We conducted a survey of all chemical manufacturing facilities regulated
between 1999 and 2001. The responses indicate that, although
most regulated facilities describe their relationships with wastewater regulators as generally either cooperative or coercive, these
facilities also regard some particular aspects of their relationships
as more consistent with one enforcement approach, while others
are more consistent with the other approach. Thus, the relationship
between regulator and facility involves multiple dimensions.
Empirical results indicate that a more cooperative enforcement
approach induces better environmental management. In other
words, as the relationship between the regulator and regulated
entity becomes more cooperative, the regulated entities improve
their environmental management.
2. Literature review
This section reviews the relevant theoretical and empirical literature on the coercive and cooperative enforcement approaches
in the environmental realm.
2.1. Theoretical studies
The theoretical literature identiﬁes two models of environmental enforcement: coercive and cooperative. The coercive model is
premised on the idea that regulated facilities’ principal motivations revolve around the maximization of expected beneﬁts net of
costs (Malloy, 2003; Spence, 2001). Facilities comply only when the
costs of non-compliance, e.g., ﬁnes, outweigh the beneﬁts of noncompliance, e.g., avoided treatment costs (Vandenbergh, 2003).1
The coercive model proceeds on the premise that increasing the
certainty and severity of penalties deters non-compliance (Becker,
1968; Kagan et al., 2003). Thus, the essential task for enforcement
agencies is to make penalties high enough and the probability of
detection/enforcement great enough that it becomes economically
irrational for facilities to violate the law (Cohen, 2000).
In contrast, the cooperative model proceeds on the assumption
that businesses are inﬂuenced by a mix of civic and societal motives.
This model postulates that businesses are generally inclined to
comply with laws (Rechtschaffen and Markell, 2003). The cooperative model’s emphasis on compliance over the deterrence of
non-compliance alters the use of both inspections and enforcement
actions. Within the cooperative model, an inspection is designed
to facilitate compliance by providing advice to regulated facilities
(Rechtschaffen and Markell, 2003), rather than to detect violations
and collect evidence for subsequent enforcement actions, as within
the coercive model. Similarly, the cooperative model’s emphasis
on compliance alters the use of enforcement. Regulated facilities
may be afforded more opportunities to avoid sanctions by resolving non-compliance before enforcement is pursued than under the
coercive model, i.e., the cooperative approach “emphasizes ﬂexible
or selective enforcement that takes into consideration the particular circumstances of an observed violation” (Scholz, 1984).

1
Costs of non-compliance include damage to the business’s reputation, potential
tort liability, and legal system expenses (Karpoff et al., 2005; Vandenbergh, 2003;
Rechtschaffen and Markell, 2003).

As an important extension, if businesses are generally committed to compliance, sanctions may prove counter-productive by
making regulated facilities resentful and less likely to cooperate
with regulators in the future (Burby and Paterson, 1993; Kagan
et al., 2003). In many contexts, random variations in facility operations or unexpected events may occasionally cause noncompliance.
A coercive response to these events may breed strong resentment
or ill will.
In essence, the cooperative model relies on ﬂexible guidelines
rather than uniform rules, an emphasis on ex ante prevention of
violations rather than ex post sanctions for noncompliance, and
compliance assistance from regulators (Burby, 1995). This model
rests on the premise that regulated facilities should respond more
positively to regulators’ suggestions on how to achieve compliance
than to the threat of coercive sanctions (Rechtschaffen and Markell,
2003).
2.2. Empirical studies
Relatively few empirical studies analyze the use of cooperative
enforcement strategies. Harrison (1995) states that past studies
hailing the merits of cooperative enforcement lack empirical support. Even less research directly compares coercive and cooperative
strategies.2
Some studies analyze the efﬁcacy of overall enforcement strategies. Harrison (1995) analyzes the regulation of water pollution in
Canada. She ﬁnds that rates of compliance with water pollution
controls are signiﬁcantly lower in the pulp and paper industry in
Canada, where the cooperative approach to enforcement predominates, than in the United States. Burby (1995) examines states’
programs to reduce erosion and sedimentation pollution in urban
areas. He concludes that “[t]he best performing state programs
[for nonpoint sources of water pollution] tend to be those that
use a highly coercive approach”. Burby and Paterson (1993) examine whether the cooperative approach is better suited to inducing
compliance with performance standards than with speciﬁcation (or
design) standards. They conclude that “a cooperative approach . . .
has much more impact on the degree of compliance attained for
performance standards than for speciﬁcation standards.” Andreen
(2007) examines compliance rates for major dischargers under the
CWA, ﬁnding that compliance rates remained static during the
period in which many states replaced traditional enforcement with
some type of cooperative enforcement.
While these empirical studies help to inform our understanding
of enforcement strategies and their relative efﬁcacy, only one study
gathers facility-speciﬁc data on the type of relationship between
regulators and regulated facilities and no study considers this
relationship as consisting of multiple dimensions. In contrast, the
present study examines both of these aspects.3
3. Empirical application
To examine the relative effects of coercive and cooperative
enforcement strategies, this study examines a speciﬁc element
relating to compliance with environmental protection regulations:
the frequency of wastewater-related self-audits implemented by
U.S. chemical manufacturing facilities whose wastewater discharges were regulated by efﬂuent limits imposed within the

2
According to Rechtschaffen (1998), “[t]he argument that cooperation works better than deterrence to achieve compliance with environmental law . . . is largely
untested”. Most of the evidence is anecdotal.
3
Notable studies explore speciﬁc cooperative approaches within a standard coercive enforcement arrangement (Short and Toffel, 2010; Helland, 1998; Stretesky and
Gabriel, 2005; Toffel and Short, 2011).
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CWA’s National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES)
between 1999 and 2001. By focusing on regulated facilities, our
analysis is able to focus on environmental audits that include an
assessment of compliance with the noted NPDES efﬂuent limits.
We choose the industrial sector of chemical and allied products as the focus of our study because it is an excellent vehicle
for examining the efﬁcacy of enforcement strategies on regulated
facilities’ environmental management. First, EPA has demonstrated
a strong interest in this sector as evidenced by its study (joint
with the Chemical Manufacturing Association [CMA], which later
became the American Chemistry Council [ACC]) on the root causes
of this sector’s non-compliance (EPA, 1999) and its study on this
sector’s compliance history [Chemical Industry National Environmental Baseline Report 1990–1994 (EPA 305-R-96-002)]. During
the study period, EPA regarded two chemical industrial sub-sectors,
industrial organics and chemical preparations, as priority industrial sectors. Second, this sector is expected to display a wide scope
in the extent of facilities’ environmental management. Consistent
with this expectation, a substantial portion of the sampled facilities
never audit over the three-year sample period, while several audit
their operations at least monthly. Third, this sector is responsible
for a signiﬁcant portion of the nation’s industrial output and a signiﬁcant portion of all wastewater discharges by facilities subject to
CWA regulation.4
Facilities may control their wastewater discharges in various
ways. In general, facilities use end-of-pipe treatment technologies or proactive environmental management practices, such as
self-audits, which collectively may constitute an environmental
management system (EMS). Examination of the latter is relevant
to policy development and trends in business management. Both
the EPA and state environmental agencies have encouraged the
adoption of environmental management systems by offering technical assistance, recognition, and regulatory beneﬁts to facilities
that employ an environmental management system (Crow, 2000).
Similarly “business-led” initiatives have promoted participation in
trade association programs emphasizing environmental management codes, such as the Responsible Care program of the American
Chemistry Council, or the adoption of international certiﬁcation
standards for environmental management, such as the International Standards Organization (ISO) 14001 program.
Some empirical studies focus on the presence or absence of an
EMS (e.g., Barla, 2007; Arimura et al., 2008). However, some of the
EMS components may not represent activities that effectively lead
to improved environmental performance (Barla, 2007). Rather than
examining the mere presence of a broad set of management activities or analyzing a count of practices, this study focuses on the use of
a particularly tangible management activity – environmental regulatory compliance audit – that is strongly expected to improve
performance. Previous empirical studies support this expectation
(Khanna and Widyawati, 2011; Short and Toffel, 2010; Toffel and
Short, 2011); in particular, Earnhart and Harrington (2014) reveal
that more audits lead to better compliance with wastewater discharge limits. As important, since the mid-1980s, the EPA has
promoted self-audits as a tool for improving environmental performance, especially environmental compliance (Evans et al., 2011). As
evidence of this promotion, the EPA has integrated environmental
auditing into its compliance and enforcement strategy; speciﬁcally,
it began in 1997 to include increased environmental auditing in
its strategic plan for improving compliance with environmental
regulations (Evans et al., 2011; EPA, 1997).

4
The chemical industry is not necessarily representative of all sectors. Indeed, its
attributes contribute to our study’s interest, e.g., some chemical ﬁrms are prompted
to control their pollution through participation in the Responsible Care program, an
initiative supported by the American Chemistry Council.
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A compliance audit represents a systematic, documented, and
objective review of a facility’s operations, which allows the facility to evaluate its compliance relative to audit criteria (American
Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM), 2003). The EPA deﬁnes
an environmental audit as “a systematic, documented, periodic
and objective review by regulated facilities of facility operations
and practices related to meeting environmental requirements”.5
Rather than examining the presence of an audit program, this
study focuses on the frequency of audits for three reasons. First,
most guidelines recommend that environmental self-audits be conducted at least annually (Ebihara and Irminger, 2005). Thus, many
facilities may conduct at least one audit per year. Second, regularly scheduled self-audits contribute to both stronger overall
environmental management and more consistent compliance with
relevant regulations (Wilson and Thomas, 1998). Thus, greater frequency should lead to better environmental management. Third,
we wish to examine the extent of environmental management
adoption by measuring the frequency with which facilities audit.
The chosen sample and focus on environmental management
facilitates an effective analysis of chemical manufacturing facilities’ responses to regulatory efforts to control wastewater-related
pollution. These efforts begin with the issuance of facility-speciﬁc
permits, which impose efﬂuent limits. To ensure compliance with
these limits, the EPA and state agencies periodically inspect facilities and take enforcement actions as needed. Inspections generally
represent the backbone of environmental agencies’ efforts to monitor compliance and collect evidence for enforcement. As for
enforcement, agencies use a mixture of informal enforcement
actions (e.g., warning letters) and formal enforcement actions (e.g.,
administrative orders, ﬁnes).
4. Empirical framework and data collection
4.1. Framework
To assess the relative efﬁcacy of the two enforcement
approaches, we estimate the relationship between environmental management, as reﬂected in self-audits conducted by regulated
facilities, and the overall enforcement approach employed against
the sampled facilities, while controlling for other inﬂuential factors.
We construct a multi-dimensional measure of enforcement
approaches. For each dimension, we create a binary indicator
that identiﬁes “cooperation” as opposed to “coercion”. The ﬁrst
dimension captures the general relationship between the regulator and the regulated facility: (1) generally cooperative or (2)
generally coercive. The second dimension captures the prevalence
of fair treatment of the facility by the regulator: (1) always fair,
(2) sometimes fair, or (3) always unfair. Environmental regulation is commonly perceived by regulated entities as “unfair”; by
extension, inﬂexible enforcement of this regulation might also be
perceived as “unfair” (Zinn, 2002). More directly, an excessively
stringent deterrence-based approach may be counterproductive
by engendering perceptions that enforcement is “unreasonable”
(Faure, 2012; Hawkins, 1984). In contrast, a ﬂexible cooperative
enforcement approach should mitigate the perceived unfairness
and unreasonableness of regulation and enforcement directly. We
argue that “always fair” treatment reﬂects a more cooperative
approach, while less than “always fair” treatment reﬂects a more
coercive approach. The third dimension captures the stability of
the relationship as reﬂected in the assignment of regulatory agency
ofﬁcials: the facility typically works (1) with the same individual
water regulatory ofﬁcial or (2) with multiple regulatory ofﬁcials

5
“Interim Guidelines on Environmental Auditing Policy Statement,” 50 FR 46504
(November 8, 1985), Section II.A.
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that vary with circumstances. Typically, working with the same
ofﬁcial is more likely to facilitate a cooperative relationship, while
working with multiple ofﬁcials is less likely to do so, i.e., more likely
to lead to a coercive relationship. The fourth dimension captures
the quality of the working relationship as reﬂected in a facility’s
decision to seek assistance from the regulator’s supervisor to help
resolve a difference of opinion between the facility and its regulator.
The absence of a request for assistance reveals a more cooperative
relationship, while the presence of a request reveals a more coercive relationship. Similarly, the ﬁfth dimension relates to whether
the facility seeks assistance from an elected ofﬁcial. Again, the
absence of a request reveals a more cooperative relationship, while
the presence of a request reveals a more coercive relationship. The
sixth dimension captures the physical proximity of the regulator as
reﬂected in the type of regulatory agency engaging the facility: (1)
regional EPA agency or (2) state agency. Closer proximity facilitates
a more cooperative relationship, while greater distance may lead
to a more coercive relationship. The last dimension captures the
level of trust supported by the relationship as reﬂected in a facility’s
willingness to allow regulators access to plant operations if regulators arrive unannounced. Greater trust reﬂects a more cooperative
relationship, while less trust reﬂects a more coercive relationship.
To measure the multi-dimensional enforcement approach, we
construct an index by summing across the indicators of cooperation presence for each enforcement strategy dimension. This index
distinguishes strategies along a spectrum of coercion–cooperation.
The lowest point on the index reﬂects a strongly coercive strategy,
while the highest point reﬂects a strongly cooperative strategy.
Our empirical analysis then tests these hypotheses: under the
coercive model, greater coercion (lower index values) leads to
better environmental management. Under the cooperative model,
greater cooperation (higher index values) leads to better environmental management.
The analysis controls for the inﬂuence of government interventions – inspections and enforcement actions – in two dimensions.
The ﬁrst dimension considers the ex ante general “threat” of receiving an intervention in the future based on the experiences of a
large number of facilities, while the second dimension considers
adjustments to this general threat based on the speciﬁc government interventions taken against particular facilities in the recent
past (Cohen, 2000). To calculate the general threats, we count the
inspections or enforcement actions taken against all other chemical facilities in the same state (for state inspections) or EPA region
(for federal inspections and enforcement) and year, while distinguishing between major and minor facilities. Then we divide each
aggregate count by the number of other major or minor chemical
facilities operating in the speciﬁc state or EPA region and given year.
Facilities may make adjustments to these general threats based
on their own experiences with recent interventions (Magat and
Viscusi, 1990). Consequently, we lag our measures by considering interventions from the preceding calendar year because audits
are recorded annually. Without this separation, some audits may
actually precede some interventions. The effects of speciﬁc government interventions targeted against particular facilities more
closely align with the effect of the regulator–regulated entity relationship so our study focuses more attention on speciﬁc adjustment
and less attention on the general threat.
The expected effects of government interventions on audit
frequency depend on the theoretical model. Under the coercive
model, both state and federal inspections should induce better
environmental behavior. However, under the cooperative model,
state inspections should induce better behavior, while federal
inspections may induce worse behavior if the presence of federal inspectors is perceived as “heavy handed”. While under the
coercive model, enforcement should induce better behavior, under
the cooperative model, enforcement may induce worse behavior

if enforcement is perceived as “heavy handed”. The hypotheses
derived from the cooperative model relate more strongly to speciﬁc
adjustment than to the general threat.6
Environmental management also depends on facility- and
ﬁrm-level characteristics: industrial sub-sector (organic chemical
indicator and inorganic chemical indicator, with “other chemicals”
as benchmark), facility size as reﬂected in number of employees,
facility size based on NPDES classiﬁcation (“major facility” indicator, with “minor facility” as benchmark), facility age, facility’s years
of experience in the NPDES regulatory system, and ﬁrm ownership structure (“publicly held” indicator, with “privately held” as
benchmark).

4.2. Data sources
We gather information from various sources. Most important, we implemented a survey of regulated chemical facilities to
gather data on the nature of facilities’ relationships with wastewater regulators, environmental management practices, especially
wastewater self-audits, and facility characteristics (e.g., age). We
also gathered publicly available data, including information on ﬁrm
ownership structure from the EPA Toxic Release Inventory (TRI),
Business and Company Resource Center, and Compustat/Research
Insight databases. We collected data from the EPA Permit Compliance System (PCS) database on each facility’s (1) location, (2)
major/minor classiﬁcation, and (3) four-digit standard industrial
classiﬁcation code. From the EPA PCS and Docket databases, we
gathered data on inspections and enforcement actions.
To implement our survey, we ﬁrst identiﬁed the population of
regulated facilities based on a full extract drawn from the EPA
PCS database as of September, 2001. We identiﬁed 1003 currently
regulated facilities.7 Of those facilities contacted between April of
2002 and March of 2003, 267 facilities completed at least 90% of
the survey, implying a 27% response rate. This rate is comparable
to previous large-scale surveys of industrial sectors (e.g., Arimura
et al., 2008, 2011; Nakamura et al., 2001) and lies above the average
response rate of 21% as identiﬁed by a review of 183 studies based
on business surveys published in academic journals (Paxson, 1992).
[The online appendix addresses the possible concern of sample
selection bias.]

4.3. Summary of data
This subsection summarizes the dependent and primary independent variables. Table 1a tabulates the distribution of self-audits
performed per year by a particular facility, which reveals that nearly
86% of the sample facilities conduct at least one audit per year.
As expected, the distinction between no audits and some audits
does not divide the sample strongly. The median facility performs

6
Other regulatory factors may affect the extent of environmental management.
The analysis attempts to control for other variation in regulatory pressure by including EPA regional indicators as regressors. The use of these regional indicators is a
blunt tool for controlling for “un-measured” variation in monitoring and enforcement across space. Inclusion of these indicators forces the analysis to identify the
effect of the overall enforcement approach based exclusively on intra-regional variation, which may be insufﬁcient for the task. Consequently, we reserve the inclusion
of regional indicators as only a means for assessing the robustness of the empirical
results.
7
We applied the following criteria to facilities: (1) possessed an NPDES permit;
(2) faced restrictions on their wastewater discharges, (3) were operating as of 2002,
and (4) discharged pollutants into surface water bodies. We focus on facilities discharging into surface waterways because facilities discharging into publicly owned
treatment systems, i.e., industrial users, face a distinctively different regulatory
regime.
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Table 1
Statistical summary.
Audit count

N

Pct

Cumulative N

Cumulative Pct

(a) Distribution of audit countsa
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
8
10
12
13
17
20
24
27
36
40
45
50
52

85
241
70
18
67
12
6
3
1
64
1
2
2
7
1
3
4
4
4
17

13.89
39.38
11.44
2.94
10.95
1.96
0.98
0.49
0.16
10.46
0.16
0.33
0.33
1.14
0.16
0.49
0.65
0.65
0.65
2.78

85
326
396
414
481
493
499
502
503
567
568
570
572
579
580
583
587
591
595
612

13.89
53.27
64.71
67.65
78.59
80.56
81.54
82.03
82.19
92.65
92.81
93.14
93.46
94.61
94.77
95.26
95.92
96.57
97.22
100.00

Mean

Variable

Std dev

(b) Means and standard deviations of regression variables
Dependent variable
Audit count

5.580

10.959

Primary explanatory variable
Regulator–regulated entity relationship index (count: 0–7)

5.990

1.046

Individual dimensions of regulator–regulated entity relationship
Generally cooperative (vs. generally coercive)
Always fair treatment (vs. sometimes fair treatment)
Same individual regulator (vs. multiple regulators)
No request for assistance from regulator’s supervisor (vs. request)
No request for assistance from elected ofﬁcial (vs. request)
State is typical regulator (vs. federal)
Always Likely to allow unannounced access (vs. likely/somewhat likely)

0.967
0.810
0.582
0.791
0.946
0.994
0.895

0.178
0.392
0.494
0.407
0.226
0.040
0.306

0.443
0.301
0.420
268.558
43.433
18.727
0.641
0.784
0.042
0.178
0.808
0.035
0.115
0.034
0.085
0.142
0.263
0.160
0.204
0.070

0.497
0.459
0.494
491.257
24.022
8.387
0.480
1.499
0.246
1.344
1.056
0.056
0.312
0.182
0.279
0.349
0.441
0.367
0.403
0.256

Control factors
Organic chemical manufacturing (vs. “other chemicals”)b
Inorganic chemical manufacturing (vs. “other chemicals”)b
Major facility classiﬁcation (vs. Minor Facility)
Facility employees (count)
Age of facility (years)
Facility’s experience with NPDES system (years)
Facility owned by publicly-held ﬁrm (vs. privately-held ﬁrm)
Preceding Calendar year state inspections (count)
Preceding calendar year federal inspections (count)
Preceding calendar year enforcement actions (count)
Annual state inspections of others/# of other facilities (count/facility)
Annual federal inspections of others/# of other facilities (count/facility)
Annual enforcement actions at others/# of other facilities (count/facility)
EPA region 1 (1,0)c
EPA region 2 (1,0)c
EPA region 3 (1,0)c
EPA region 4 (1,0)c
EPA region 5 (1,0)c
EPA region 6 (1,0)c
EPA region 7 (1,0)c
Dimension of relationship

(1)

(2)

(c) Correlations between individual dimensions of regulator–regulated entity relationshipd
(1) Likelihood of allowing regulator access to
plant without announcement: always likely
vs. not
(2) Typical type of regulator: state vs. federal
0.089
(0.162)
0.021
0.106
(3) Stability of interaction: same individual vs.
(0.745)
(0.096)
multiple individuals
−0.055
0.070
(4) Treatment of regulated entity by regulator:
(0.382)
(0.267)
always fair treatment vs. not always fair
−0.054
−0.015
(5) Overall relationship: cooperative vs.
coercive
(0.388)
(0.811)
0.015
−0.054
(6) Requested assistance from regulator’s
(0.808)
(0.394)
supervisor: no vs. yes

(3)

(4)

(5)

0.224
(0.000)
0.099
(0.115)
0.059
(0.350)

0.345
(0.000)
0.222
(0.000)

0.2222
(0.000)

(6)
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Table 1 (Continued )
Dimension of relationship

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7) Requested assistance from elected ofﬁcial:
no vs. yes

0.055
(0.383)

−0.024
(0.709)

0.033
(0.602)

0.080
(0.205)

0.076
(0.227)

0.221
(0.000)

Index

N

Pct

Cumulative N

Cumulative Pct

1
5
21
59
132
215

0.47
2.33
9.77
27.44
61.40
100.00

e

(d) Distribution of regulator–regulated entity relationship index
2
1
0.47
4
1.86
3
16
7.44
4
38
17.67
5
73
33.95
6
7
83
38.60
a

Based on sample used for estimation of year-speciﬁc equations.
The analysis aggregates the four-digit SIC codes into three broader sectoral categories: organic chemicals, inorganic chemicals, and “other” chemicals. The broad category
of organic chemicals includes the following four-digit SIC codes: 2821, 2823, 2824, 2843, 2865, 2869, 2891, and 2899. The broad category of inorganic chemicals includes the
following four-digit SIC codes: 2812, 2813, 2816, 2819, 2873, and 2874.
c
Omitted category = EPA Regions 8 and 9.
d
Based on full survey sample; p-values shown in parentheses.
e
Based on sample used for between-group estimation.
b

a single audit per year. A majority of facilities (54%) conduct one to
three audits per year.8
Table 1b summarizes the dimensions reﬂecting a facility’s
relationship with its regulator. Only 3% of facilities regard their
relationship as “generally coercive,” while 97% regard it as “generally cooperative.” Moreover, 19% of facilities report that regulatory
treatment is “sometimes fair, sometimes unfair”, while 81% report
that it is “always fair”. No facility reports that its treatment is
“always unfair”. Table 1c also indicates that 58% of facilities typically work with the same regulator, while 42% typically work with
multiple regulators. Additionally, 79% of facilities did not seek help
from the supervisor of the regulator, while 21% did. Similarly, 95%
of facilities did not request assistance from an elected ofﬁcial, while
5% did. In addition, 99% of facilities report that they typically work
with state regulators, while only 1% report that they typically work
with federal regulators.9 Lastly, 90% of facilities are “always likely”
to allow regulators access to plant operations if regulators arrive
unannounced, while 9% are either “likely” or “somewhat likely” to
allow access, yet no facility is “not at all likely” to allow access.
Next, the analysis compares the responses to the individual
relationship-related questions by calculating Pearson pairwise correlation coefﬁcients between all possible pairs of relationship
elements; Table 1c reports these correlations. In general, these
statistics reveal only weak correlation between the various measures capturing the relationship between the regulator and the
regulated entity. Of the 21 pairwise correlations, only six are positive and statistically signiﬁcantly different from zero (i.e., p ≤ 0.10).
Of these signiﬁcantly positive correlations, the largest magnitude
is only 0.35, indicating limited connection between these pairs of
responses. As important, ﬁve of the correlations are actually negative though the coefﬁcients are insigniﬁcantly different from zero.
The remaining 10 correlations are positive but insigniﬁcantly different from zero. This analysis demonstrates that the relationship
between a regulator and a regulated entity consists of multiple
dimensions. In other words, no single underlying dimension seems
to reﬂect all of the responses.
Based on this conclusion, the analysis calculates an index of
coercion–cooperation by summing across the seven dichotomous

8
Wastewater compliance is typically assessed monthly via submission of a
monthly discharge monitoring report (DMR) to a regulatory authority; 10 % of
facilities conduct self-audits monthly.
9
State regulators predominate because EPA has delegated NPDES permitting
authority to state environmental agencies in most states. As of 2006, only ﬁve states
had not received authority to administer at least some aspect of the NPDES permit
program.

indicators of cooperation–coercion.10 Table 1d tabulates the distribution of this index. Nearly 39% of the facilities experience a
fully cooperative relationship with their regulators, while no facility experiences a fully coercive relationship. Only 2% of facilities
experience a relationship that is more coercive than cooperative
(index ≤ 3), with 7% facing a relationship that is a reasonably balanced mix of the two (index = 4). Thus, the strongest variation in
the index lies at the upper reaches of cooperation (5 ≤ index ≤ 7).
As with many studies of environmental management relying on
surveys, of the 267 facilities who completed most of the survey,
only 215 provide complete information for our full analysis.
Table 1b provides a statistical summary of all the formulated
variables.
5. Estimation methods and results
5.1. Estimation methods
This subsection describes estimation methods used to examine
the link from enforcement approach to environmental management while addressing important econometric considerations.
As one important econometric consideration, our primary
explanatory variable – enforcement approach – may be an endogenous regressor. The validity of this concern over endogeneity varies
across the components included in the enforcement approach
index. On one end of the spectrum, certain components clearly represent decisions made by the regulator or facility, e.g., facilities’
requests for assistance from an elected ofﬁcial. On the other end,
certain components are most likely exogenously determined, e.g.,
primary type of regulator – state vs. federal – depends on whether
a state has primacy over the NPDES program within its borders.
We assess this endogeneity concern by implementing tests of
exogeneity. For this implementation, we use three instruments
expected to affect the enforcement approach but not independently affect facilities’ audit decisions: (1) time since the state
agency gained primacy to implement the NPDES program, (2)
two-year lagged state inspections, and (3) two-year lagged federal
inspections.11 Based on both partial F-test and Minimum Eigenvalue statistics, these instruments appear relevant. Based on both

10
If a facility is “always likely” to allow a regulator access to the facility’s operations, the relationship is deemed “cooperative”, otherwise, the relationship is
deemed “coercive”.
11
Anton et al. (2004) use additionally lagged measures of inspections in order
to test the exogeneity of environmental management when environmental performance is the dependent variable.
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Sargan and Basman Test of Overidentifying Restrictions statistics,
the instruments do not appear invalid. Most important, both WuHausman and Durban Test of Exogeneity statistics fail to reject the
null hypothesis of exogeneity. (All of these conclusions are fully
robust to the time period analyzed and the regressor set used for
estimation.12 These conclusions are also fully robust to the use
of a single instrument – time since gaining primacy, which represents the strongest instrument from a theoretical perspective.
Speciﬁcally, after controlling for government interventions and the
overall enforcement approach, state primacy should not directly
affect facilities’ audit decisions.) Consequently, we do not employ
an instrumental variables estimator since the beneﬁts seem outweighed by the costs of reduced efﬁciency in the estimates when
the regressors appear uncorrelated with the error process.
In addition, the dependent variable of audit frequency represents a sum of discrete events, i.e., count data. Accordingly, we
employ two pairs of count data estimators: Poisson and negative
binomial, each in standard form and zero inﬂated form (Cameron
and Trivedi, 1998).
The collected data measure environmental management over
multiple years (1999–2001) for each facility. To accommodate the
panel data structure, we employ two estimation approaches. The
ﬁrst approach uses a between-group estimator, which collapses
the panel data into a single cross-section by calculating the sample
means for the dependent variable and all the independent variables
and then estimates the functional relationship based on the calculated mean values. The second approach considers each year of data
as a separate cross-section and estimates the functional relationship for each year separately within a joint system of equations
that constructs a separate equation for each year. Joint estimation
of the three year-speciﬁc equations increases the efﬁciency of the
estimates by exploiting the correlation across the three equations’
error terms.13
The analysis considers three regressor sets. Model 1 excludes
the government intervention-related factors. Model 2 includes only
the speciﬁc adjustment factors. Model 3 includes both the speciﬁc adjustment and the general threat factors. By excluding the
government-related factors, Model 1 allows the estimated effects
of the overall enforcement strategy to absorb all of the inﬂuences
associated with any differential use of inspections and enforcement
actions. Moreover, the analysis considers two model sets: Model
Set A includes the regressors for between-group estimation, while
Model Set B includes the regressors for year-speciﬁc estimation.
Tables 2a and 2b reports the between-group estimates for Model
Set A (Models A1–A3). Tables 3a and 3b reports the year-speciﬁc
estimates for Model Set B (Models B1–B3). Tables 2a and 3a display the standard Poisson estimates; Tables 2b and 3b display the
standard negative binomial estimates.
The overdispersion tests shown in Tables 2b and 3b reveal that
the negative binomial estimates appear to dominate the Poisson
estimates. Still, we interpret both estimate sets as part of our

12

Depending on the time period and regressor set, the partial F-test p-values
lie between 0.0001 and 0.0069, the overidentifying restrictions test p-values lie
between 0.260 and 0.849, and the exogeneity test p-values lie between 0.154 and
0.492.
13
While the dependent variable – audit frequency – and most of the regressors vary over the sample period (1999–2001), the measures capturing the overall
enforcement strategy do not vary over the sample period for a given facility. The survey questions generating these measures either explicitly or implicitly instruct the
respondents to consider the preceding three-year period as a whole. Due to this lack
of variation over time, use of the between-group estimator seems the most appropriate estimation approach since this approach considers the three-year period as a
single cross section. Then again, the analysis may reasonably assume that the measures of overall enforcement strategy sufﬁciently apply to each individual year as
well as they apply to the whole three-year period.
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robustness assessment. Yet when these two estimate sets differ,
more weight should be given to the negative binomial estimates.
Finally, we assess the zero inﬂated estimates. Vuong tests assess
whether the zero inﬂated form of a data count estimator dominates
the standard form. Test statistics reveal that the zero inﬂated form
dominates in the case of the Poisson estimator (p ≤ 0.006) but not in
the case of the negative binomial estimator (p ≥ 0.501). Given this
mixed message and extra complexity of the zero inﬂated form, we
assess the zero inﬂated estimates, without tabulation, only as part
of our robustness assessment, while focusing on the estimates for
the primary regressor.
5.2. Interpretation of effects not related to enforcement and
monitoring
This subsection interprets the effects not related to enforcement and monitoring starting with the between-group estimates.
The following conclusions are robust across the three models and
between the Poisson and negative binomial estimates except as
noted. First, inorganic chemical manufacturing facilities audit less
frequently than “other” chemical manufacturing facilities. (Poisson
estimates of Model 3 also reveal that organic chemical manufacturing facilities audit less frequently than “other chemical”
manufacturing facilities.) Second, major facilities audit more frequently than minor facilities (based on the Poisson estimates but
not the negative binomial estimates). Third, the shift from minor
class to major class prompts more audits, yet facilities with more
employees audit less frequently than facilities with fewer employees (in both cases, based on Poisson but not negative binomial
estimates). These results reveal economies or diseconomies of scale
with respect to environmental management depending on the
proxy of facility size. Fourth, older facilities audit more frequently
(but not based on negative binomial estimates of Models A2 and
A3). Fifth, more experienced facilities audit less frequently. Sixth,
facilities owned by publicly held ﬁrms audit less frequently than
facilities owned by privately held ﬁrms.
This assessment reveals that the Poisson estimation generates
more traction for the control factors yet both the Poisson and negative binomial estimates support conclusions that are generally
robust to the inclusion of the government intervention factors as
regressors.
As shown in Table 3, the year-speciﬁc estimates support identical conclusions in the case of the Poisson estimates and highly
similar conclusions in the case of the negative binomial estimates
(even then coefﬁcient signs are identical except in four minor cases
where p ≥ 0.8).14
Although not tabulated, the Poisson zero inﬂated estimates support nearly identical conclusions and the negative binomial zero
inﬂated estimates support highly similar conclusions.
5.3. Interpretation of effects related to enforcement and
monitoring
This subsection interprets the effects of the overall enforcement
strategy on environmental management, along with the effects of
intervention-related factors. Both the Poisson and negative binomial results strongly reveal that greater cooperation apparently
leads to more frequent audits. As shown in Table 3, this conclusion

14
Negative binomial between-group estimates prove statistically signiﬁcant yet
the following year-speciﬁc estimates prove insigniﬁcant for the following factors:
years of experience with the NPDES system in 1999 (Model B1) and in 2001 (Model
B3), facility age in 2001 (Model B1), and ﬁrm ownership structure in 2001 (Models
B2 and B3). The opposite holds the following factors: facility age in 2000 (Model B3)
and number of facility employees in 2001 (Model B3).
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Table 2
Between-group estimation of audit counts: Model Set A.
Variablea

Model A1

Model A2

Coeff
(a) Poisson between-group estimation
Regulator–regulated entity relationship index
Organic chemical manufacturing (vs. “other”)
Inorganic chemical manufacturing (vs. “other”)
Major facility classiﬁcation (vs. minor)
Facility employees (count)
Age of facility (years)
Facility’s experience with NPDES system (years)
Facility owned by publicly-held ﬁrm (vs. privately-held)
Preceding calendar year state inspections (count)
Preceding calendar year federal inspections (count)
Preceding calendar year enforcement actions (count)
Annual state inspections of others/# of other facilities
Annual federal inspections of others/# of other facilities
Annual enforcement actions at others/# of other facilities
LR test of zero slopes (2 )
Pseudo R2
Goodness of ﬁt (2 )
Sample size
(b) Negative binomial between-group estimation
Regulator–regulated entity relationship index
Organic chemical manufacturing (vs. “other”)
Inorganic chemical manufacturing (vs. “other”)
Major facility classiﬁcation (vs. Minor)
Facility employees (count)
Age of facility (years)
Facility’s experience with NPDES system (years)
Facility owned by publicly-held ﬁrm (vs. privately-held)
Preceding calendar year state inspections (count)
Preceding calendar year federal inspections (count)
Preceding calendar year enforcement actions (count)
Annual state inspections of others/# of other facilities
Annual federal inspections of others/# of other facilities
Annual enforcement actions at others/# of other facilities
LR test of zero slopes (2 )
Pseudo R2
Overdispersion test (2 )
Sample size
a

p-Value

0.2239
−0.0682
−0.7403
0.4960
−0.0002
0.0052
−0.0264
−0.4798

0.000
0.314
0.000
0.000
0.018
0.000
0.000
0.000

302.6

0.000

p-Value

0.2264
−0.0876
−0.6623
0.5536
−0.0003
0.0044
−0.0299
−0.3407
0.0200
−3.5875
0.1451

0.000
0.199
0.000
0.000
0.002
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.423
0.000
0.000

391.9

0.1004

0.000

Coeff
0.2148
−0.1500
−0.7239
0.7556
−0.0004
0.0042
−0.0266
−0.3509
−0.0317
−3.3506
0.1388
0.0784
−4.5394
0.2132
419.5

0.1300
0.000

2169

Model A3

Coeff

2079

0.000

215

2052

215

0.2189
−0.0291
−0.7972
0.2732
−0.0002
0.0067
−0.0255
−0.5127

0.016
0.904
0.003
0.163
0.375
0.099
0.045
0.021

0.2177
−0.0732
−0.6978
0.2266
−0.0003
0.0056
−0.0273
−0.4210
0.1034
−2.5560
0.1321

0.018
0.762
0.011
0.303
0.246
0.166
0.030
0.062
0.160
0.003
0.278

0.2183
−0.2198
−0.8052
0.4596
−0.0003
0.0047
−0.0239
−0.3954
0.0729
−2.6360
0.1420
0.0344
−4.0640
0.1601

30.54

0.000

40.22

0.000

42.52

0.0263
1581

0.0346
0.000

215

1501

0.000
215

1476

p-Value
0.000
0.031
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.308
0.000
0.000
0.061
0.000
0.196
0.000
0.1391
0.000
215

0.019
0.408
0.005
0.125
0.140
0.255
0.067
0.082
0.498
0.002
0.339
0.813
0.144
0.779
0.000
0.0366
0.000
215

Each model also includes an intercept term.

is fully robust to the time period analyzed. Thus, greater cooperation leads to more audits in each year of the sample period. As
important, this conclusion is fully robust to the choice of regressor
set. Thus, greater cooperation leads to better environmental management even when the analysis controls for the differential use
of inspections and enforcement actions and the threat of their use.
(The single exception is the negative binomial estimate of Model
B2 in 1999 where the p-value slips to 0.14). Lastly, this conclusion is fully robust to the use of zero inﬂated Poisson and negative
binomial estimators.15
To complement this interpretation, we next interpret the effects
of intervention-related factors. We ﬁrst assess the between-group
estimation results, as shown in Table 2. The conclusions are robust
between the Poisson and negative binomial estimates unless noted.
The estimation results reveal that a greater use of federal inspections apparently prompts less frequent audits, as does the greater
threat of federal inspections (based on Poisson estimates), yet a
greater threat of state inspections appears to prompt more frequent

15
We also assess robustness by exploring whether the results are sensitive to the
inclusion of EPA regional indicators as regressors. Despite the inclusion of these
regressors, the effect of the cooperation–coercion index remains signiﬁcant based
on both the between-group and year-speciﬁc estimation results for both the Poisson
estimator and negative binomial estimator.

audits (based on Poisson estimates). These results are consistent
with the reported conclusion that greater cooperation prompts
more frequent audits. Perhaps federal inspections are more coercive, undermining efforts to audit frequently. In contrast, state
inspectors are more cooperative, improving audit frequency. This
latter conclusion is somewhat weak as it is drawn from the threat
of state inspections rather than the differential use of such inspections. In contrast to the differential use of federal inspections, a
greater use of enforcement actions prompts more frequent audits
(based on Poisson estimates) perhaps because properly targeted
enforcement improves environmental management even though
enforcement may be perceived as coercive. These conclusions are
fully robust to the choice of regressor set. These points notwithstanding, the dominant negative binomial estimates identify only
a single signiﬁcant effect: more federal inspections lead to less frequent audits.
Moreover, conclusions depend on the time period analyzed as
shown in Table 3. Comparison of the between group and yearspeciﬁc Poisson estimates reveal these differences. First, greater
use of state inspections prompts more audits in 1999 but fewer
audits in 2001. Second, greater use of enforcement actions induces
fewer audits in 1999 but more audits in 2001. Third, a greater
threat of state inspections induces more audits in 2001 but not in
1999 or 2000. Fourth, a greater threat of enforcement induces more
audits in 1999 and 2000 but fewer audits in 2001. Comparison of
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Table 3
Joint estimation of year-speciﬁc equations for audit counts: Model Set B.
Variablea

Model B1
Coeff

(a) Joint Poisson estimation
Year 1999 [N = 215]
Regulator–regulated entity relationship index
Organic chemical manufacturing (vs. “other”)
Inorganic chemical manufacturing (vs. “other”)
Major facility classiﬁcation (vs. minor)
Facility employees (count)
Age of facility (years)
Facility’s experience with NPDES system (years)
Facility owned by publicly-held ﬁrm (vs. privately-held)
Preceding calendar year state inspections (count)
Preceding calendar year federal inspections (count)
Preceding calendar year enforcement actions (count)
Annual state inspections of others/# of other facilities
Annual federal inspections of others/# of other facilities
Annual enforcement actions at others/# of other facilities
Year 2000 [N = 215]
Regulator–regulated entity relationship index
Organic chemical manufacturing (vs. “other”)
Inorganic chemical manufacturing (vs. “other”)
Major facility classiﬁcation (vs. minor)
Facility employees (count)
Age of facility (years)
Facility’s experience with NPDES system (years)
Facility owned by publicly-held ﬁrm (vs. privately-held)
Preceding calendar year state inspections (count)
Preceding calendar year federal inspections (count)
Preceding calendar year enforcement actions (count)
Annual state inspections of others/# of other facilities
Annual federal inspections of others/# of other facilities
Annual enforcement actions at others/# of other facilities
Year 2001 [N = 215]
Regulator–regulated entity relationship index
Organic chemical manufacturing (vs. “other”)
Inorganic chemical manufacturing (vs. “other”)
Major facility classiﬁcation (vs. Minor)
Facility employees (count)
Age of facility (years)
Facility’s experience with NPDES system (years)
Facility owned by publicly-held ﬁrm (vs. privately-held)
Preceding calendar year state inspections (count)
Preceding calendar year federal inspections (count)
Preceding calendar year enforcement actions (count)
Annual state inspections of others/# of other facilities
Annual federal inspections of others/# of other facilities
Annual enforcement actions at others/# of other facilities
LR test of zero slopes (2 )
Pseudo R2
Goodness of ﬁt (2 )
(b) Joint negative binomial estimation
Year 1999 [N = 215]
Regulator–regulated entity relationship index
Organic chemical manufacturing (vs. “other”)
Inorganic chemical manufacturing (vs. “other”)
Major facility classiﬁcation (vs. minor)
Facility employees (count)
Age of facility (years)
Facility’s experience with NPDES system (years)
Facility owned by publicly-held ﬁrm (vs. privately-held)
Preceding calendar year state inspections (count)
Preceding calendar year federal inspections (count)
Preceding calendar year enforcement actions (count)
Annual state inspections of others/# of other facilities
Annual federal inspections of others/# of other facilities
Annual enforcement actions at others/# of other facilities
Year 2000 [N = 215]
Regulator–regulated entity relationship index
Organic chemical manufacturing (vs. “other”)
Inorganic chemical manufacturing (vs. “other”)
Major facility classiﬁcation (vs. minor)
Facility employees (count)

Model B2
p-Value

Coeff

Model B3
p-Value

Coeff

p-Value

0.1472
−0.0184
−0.8817
0.3863
−0.0003
0.0064
−0.0175
−0.4347

0.000
0.805
0.000
0.000
0.004
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.1503
−0.0103
−0.8507
0.3802
−0.0003
0.0057
−0.0206
−0.4244
0.0728
−2.4426
−0.0660

0.000
0.889
0.000
0.000
0.004
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.003
0.001
0.024

0.1631
−0.0432
−0.8581
0.4470
−0.0004
0.0057
−0.0207
−0.4209
0.0701
−2.5067
−0.0823
0.0246
−2.9774
0.3402

0.000
0.575
0.000
0.000
0.002
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.025
0.000
0.011
0.582
0.050
0.027

0.2273
−0.0135
−0.6488
0.4430
−0.0002
0.0054
−0.0297
−0.5178

0.000
0.843
0.000
0.000
0.021
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.2258
−0.0060
−0.6394
0.5092
−0.0002
0.0047
−0.0298
−0.4787
−0.0128
−1.4908
−0.0001

0.000
0.930
0.000
0.000
0.010
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.573
0.000
0.999

0.2239
−0.0460
−0.6704
0.5352
−0.0003
0.0050
−0.0297
−0.4791
−0.0311
−1.4408
−0.0162
0.0579
−1.5714
0.2605

0.000
0.510
0.000
0.000
0.002
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.239
0.000
0.759
0.147
0.018
0.104

0.2087
−0.0034
−0.6274
0.4651
−0.0001
0.0046
−0.0250
−0.3525

0.000
0.960
0.000
0.000
0.074
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.2108
−0.0320
−0.6033
0.4159
−0.0002
0.0043
−0.0264
−0.2272
−0.0018
−2.4120
0.1786

0.000
0.637
0.000
0.000
0.004
0.000
0.000
0.001
0.925
0.000
0.000

0.1653
−0.0727
−0.7065
0.8474
−0.0003
0.0022
−0.0194
−0.2210
−0.0632
−2.5118
0.2091
0.0700
−7.2301
−1.4047

0.000
0.294
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.061
0.000
0.001
0.005
0.000
0.000
0.052
0.000
0.000

796.6

0.000

1006.6

0.0909
6422

0.000

1131.6

0.000

6087

0.1149
0.000

6212

0.000
0.1292
0.000

0.1640
−0.0737
−0.9367
0.2206
−0.0004
0.0069
−0.0195
−0.4483

0.096
0.778
0.001
0.294
0.142
0.112
0.152
0.052

0.1457
−0.1012
−0.9965
0.1232
−0.0003
0.0063
−0.0214
−0.5057
0.1368
−2.2660
−0.1110

0.142
0.701
0.000
0.619
0.161
0.145
0.115
0.028
0.129
0.020
0.227

0.1723
−0.2342
−1.0635
0.2652
−0.0004
0.0063
−0.0214
−0.4931
0.1684
−2.3603
−0.1446
−0.0347
−5.2178
0.6055

0.088
0.421
0.000
0.436
0.119
0.152
0.122
0.033
0.134
0.018
0.157
0.796
0.283
0.233

0.9927
0.2233
−0.7234
0.1968
−0.0002

0.020
0.922
0.009
0.331
0.344

0.2250
0.0398
−0.6776
0.2466
−0.0002

0.021
0.873
0.015
0.271
0.331

0.2363
−0.0235
−0.7148
0.2242
−0.0003

0.016
0.932
0.014
0.466
0.261
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Table 3 (Continued)
Variablea

Model B1
Coeff

Age of facility (years)
Facility’s experience with NPDES system (years)
Facility owned by publicly-held ﬁrm (vs. privately-held)
Preceding calendar year state inspections (count)
Preceding calendar year federal inspections (count)
Preceding calendar year enforcement actions (count)
Annual state inspections of others/# of other facilities
Annual federal inspections of others/# of other facilities
Annual enforcement actions at others/# of other facilities
Year 2001 [N = 215]
Regulator–regulated entity relationship index
Organic chemical manufacturing (vs. “other”)
Inorganic chemical manufacturing (vs. “other”)
Major facility classiﬁcation (vs. minor)
Facility employees (count)
Age of facility (years)
Facility’s experience with NPDES system (years)
Facility owned by publicly-held ﬁrm (vs. privately-held)
Preceding calendar year state inspections (count)
Preceding calendar year federal inspections (count)
Preceding calendar year enforcement actions (count)
Annual state inspections of others/# of other facilities
Annual federal inspections of others/# of other facilities
Annual enforcement actions at others/# of other facilities
LR test of zero slopes (2 )
Pseudo R2
Overdispersion test (2 )
a

Model B2
p-Value

Coeff

Model B3
p-Value

Coeff

p-Value

0.0078
−0.0299
−0.5118

0.066
0.024
0.022

0.0067
−0.0318
−0.4633
0.0180
−1.3722
−0.0056

0.116
0.016
0.044
0.822
0.020
0.983

0.0072
−0.0326
−0.4455
−0.0178
−1.3281
−0.0735
0.0617
−1.0191
0.4065

0.097
0.015
0.052
0.871
0.025
0.788
0.651
0.625
0.503

0.2192
0.0885
−0.6451
0.2988
−0.0001
0.0061
−0.0242
−0.3723

0.018
0.722
0.018
0.144
0.541
0.145
0.074
0.116

0.2387
−0.0316
−0.6283
0.1456
−0.0003
0.0062
−0.0265
−0.2804
0.0540
−0.6034
0.1779

0.010
0.898
0.025
0.497
0.188
0.126
0.045
0.240
0.353
0.200
0.028

0.2031
−0.1727
−0.7435
0.5204
−0.0004
0.0034
−0.0164
−0.2707
−0.0137
−0.6285
0.2442
0.0884
−5.4846
−1.8744

0.033
0.505
0.009
0.079
0.075
0.416
0.236
0.258
0.864
0.194
0.009
0.509
0.019
0.091

79.53

0.000

104.89

0.0240
4729

115.16

0.000
0.0316

0.000

4544

0.000

4429

0.000
0.0347
0.000

Each model also includes a set of three year-speciﬁc intercept terms.

the between group and year-speciﬁc negative binomial estimates
reveals fewer differences. For years 1999 and 2000, no differences
appear. However, the 2001 estimates reveal differences similar
to the Poisson year-speciﬁc estimates: the greater threat of federal inspections and enforcement lowers audit frequency, yet the
greater use of enforcement increases audit frequency. In sum, variation across time indicates that the role of government interventions
depends on changing conditions.
Finally, the zero inﬂated estimates reveal highly similar patterns
especially in the case of between group estimates. As two notable
exceptions, the statistical signiﬁcance of the general threat of state
inspections slips to p = 0.12 in the Poison estimates and the significance of the differential use of federal inspections slips to p = 0.11
in the negative binomial estimates.
5.4. Further assessment of the robustness of conclusions
Our construction of the cooperation–coercion index is clearly
simple. As our last form of robustness, we explore alternative means of incorporating the multiple dimensions of the
regulator–regulated facility relationship. We begin this exploration
by implementing exploratory factor analysis on the seven individual dimensions. This analysis identiﬁes three factors with positive
eigenvalues as shown in Table 4a. The pattern of factor loadings
for these three identiﬁed factors is shown in Table 4b. These loadings reveal that ﬁve of the seven dimensions load most strongly on
Factor-1, while one dimension (primary regulator: state vs. federal)
loads most strongly on Factor-2 and another dimension (willingness to allow unannounced access) loads most strongly on Factor-3.
Given these results, we fashion two assessment paths. First, we
generate ﬁtted values for Factor-1, Factor-2, and Factor-3 and use
these ﬁtted factors in lieu of the cooperation–coercion index in our
estimation routines. Second, we construct an alternative index from
the ﬁve dimensions that load most strongly on Factor-1 and use
this alternative index in lieu of the initial index in our estimation

routines. We also include the two remaining dimensions as two
separate regressors.
We focus our assessment of robustness on the primary
regressor. Estimates generated by the ﬁrst assessment path
fully support the conclusions reported above. The coefﬁcient on
Factor-1 (ˇ1) proves signiﬁcantly positive. (In the Poisson estimates, p = 0.000 and ˇ1 ∈ [0.280,0.300]; in the negative binomial

Table 4
Factor analysis.
Factor

Eigenvalue

(a) Eigenvalues
Factor-1
Factor-2
Factor-3
Factor-4
Factor-5
Factor-6
Factor-7

0.85247
0.24086
0.18367
−0.06041
−0.13842
−0.18025
−0.23073

Regulator–regulated entity
relationship dimension
(b) Factor loadings
Generally cooperative (vs. generally
coercive)
Always fair treatment (vs. sometimes
fair treatment)
Same individual regulator (vs. multiple
regulators)
No request for assistance from
regulator’s supervisor (vs. request)
No Request for assistance from elected
ofﬁcial (vs. request)
State is typical regulator (vs. federal)
Always likely to allow unannounced
access (vs. likely/somewhat likely)

Factor-1

Factor-2

Factor-3

0.4886

−0.0225

−0.1140

0.5489

0.1179

−0.0735

0.2778

0.2420

0.0028

0.4151

−0.1956

0.1115

0.2451

−0.1982

0.2143

0.0407
−0.0346

0.2884
0.0850

0.1571
0.2868
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estimates, p ∈ [0.055,0.067] and ˇ1 ∈ [0.264,0.272].) The coefﬁcient
on Factor-2 does not prove statistically signiﬁcant (p > 0.10). The
coefﬁcient on Factor-3 (ˇ3) proves signiﬁcantly positive in the
Poisson estimates (p = 0.008; ˇ3 ∈ [0.202,0.205]) but insigniﬁcantly
positive in the negative binomial estimates (p > 0.10). Thus, we conclude that, in general, greater cooperation leads to more frequent
audits, yet the type of primary regulator – state vs. federal – does
not matter, while the evidence of greater trust (greater willingness
to allow unannounced access) leading to more frequent audits is
not supported in our better estimates.
Estimates generated by the second assessment path also support
our original conclusions. The coefﬁcient on the more narrow index
of cooperation–coercion (ˇ > 0) proves signiﬁcantly positive. (In
the Poisson estimates, p = 0.000 and ˇ ∈ [0.232,0.242]; in the negative binomial estimates, p ∈ [0.023,0.028] and ˇ ∈ [0.216,0.218].)
Yet the coefﬁcients for type of primary regulator – state vs. federal – and trust (willingness to allow unannounced access) prove
statistically insigniﬁcant (p > 0.357). Again, greater cooperation, in
general, leads to more frequent audits.

6. Policy and research implications
The conclusions generated by the empirical results possess
policy and research implications. First, these conclusions imply
that environmental regulators seeking to induce better environmental management practices should employ a more cooperative
approach, not a more coercive approach. Second, these conclusions
imply that future research on an environmental regulator’s enforcement strategy should not view this strategy as unidimensional.
Instead, future research should view the enforcement strategy as
representing a relationship between a regulator and a regulated
entity and attempt to measure multiple dimensions of this relationship.
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